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II. Modernism and the (extended) mind
eManuscripts in progress 
establishing a digital infrastructure for Joyce’s extended mind at work
Tom De Keyser
1
Modernist literature has long been conceived as “internalist” literature. Even the 
Modernists themselves seemed to embrace this idea and eagerly claimed to “look within.” 
Virginia Woolf’s own rhetoric in this context is striking. An internalist approach to literature 
would represent life in a much more exciting way.
2
 According to Woolf, the mind’s multitude 
of impressions form an “incessant shower of innumerable atoms” that shape the “luminous 
halo” that life really is.
3
 Redirecting the focus from the external world to the internal world 
of the mind therefore makes literature a lot more interesting. Nowadays however, analysing 
modernist texts as inward-looking seems to have become a “critical commonplace” in the 
study of literary modernism.
4 While Woolf’s work often thematises the workings of the mind, 
recent criticism has made clear that this thematisation may not involve an inward turn at 
all. What Woolf did in, for instance, “The Mark on the Wall” is not simply look within, but 
describe a mind that is in constant interaction with the outside world. Cognitive philosophers 
have investigated the nuances of this interaction and have called it “enactivism,” “cognitive 
integration,” or “extended mind”.
5
 In my research project, I will argue that manuscripts, 
notebooks, and external sources are part and parcel of a writer’s extended mind at work. 
Specifically, I will apply the extended mind hypothesis to literature by visualising James Joyce’s 
writing process on the basis of his personal libraries, notebooks, and manuscripts of Finnegans 
Wake. I believe that this application will create opportunities to investigate how the extended 
mind influences the evocations of characters’ minds. I will here provide an overview of how 
to approach these issues in the coming years. It will be made clear that visualising an extended 
mind at work necessarily relies on the study of writing processes, or genetic criticism. It is one 
of the major building blocks in this project, together with the recent developments in cognitive 
science. This paper attempts to illustrate the importance of these building blocks. 
“Whoevery heard of such a think?”— enactivism and the extended mind
The Cartesian model of the mind has become increasingly implausible to a number of 
cognitive scientists. A growing strand in cognitive science seeks to puncture the conviction 
that the mind is essentially “inside,” and therefore contrasted with an “outside.” The enactive 
approach addresses this head-on. The notion was first introduced into cognitive science by 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) in their book The embodied mind. They argue that “cognition 
is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment 
of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the 
world performs”.
6
 Two aspects stand out in this argument. First, the mind does not necessarily 
create a representation of reality. We do not find ourselves in a “pre-given” world by means 
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of a “pre-given” mind, but experience a world through the reciprocal coupling between the 
senses and its immediate environment. In other words, the mind is not a mirror of the outside 
world,
7 nor do we possess some ready-made —“pre-given”— knowledge of the environment. 
Rather, the mind emerges from processes that play a crucial role in interconnecting brain, 
body, and environment. Second, actions are central to cognitive processes. Cognition guides 
“our ability to act on the world”.
8
 Instead of carrying information that is pre-set in our minds 
(“knowing that”), we possess expectations of how our experience will change depending on 
our actions (“knowing how”, after Ryle 1945). The possibility to act on the environment in 
turn helps to shape the accuracy of the expectations. Enactivism’s insistence on the distinction 
between “knowing how” and “knowing that” shows that it refuses to conceive of the mind as 
an information-processing device, and explains that the mind emerges from action-focused 
interactions between body and environment. 
Seven years after the introduction of enactivism into cognitive science, Andy Clark and 
David J. Chalmers suggested a notion that also regards cognitive processes as essentially 
action centred. They called it “active externalism” or “the extended mind.” Their influential 
work opened with a question that since then has become a primary motive for cognitive 
philosophers: “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?”.
9
 The extended 
mind hypothesis is based on two important ideas: (1) the environment plays an “active” role in 
our cognitive processes, which means that (2) cognitive processes are necessarily “coupled” with 
the environment. In other words, cognition emerges from a collaboration of inner processes 
and manipulations of the environment.
10
 It is clear that the extended mind hypothesis and 
enactivism are closely related. Though they are not identical, they prove to be comparable and 
the differences turn out to be subtle.
11 Enactivists also believe that cognition is action centred 
and coupled, but they reject the idea that physical objects from the environment can be part of 
the mind. This difference is explained by Clark & Chalmers (1998) with the famous example 
of Otto, an Alzheimer’s patient. Because of his disease, Otto uses a notebook to remember, for 
instance, the address of a museum. The notebook thus includes information of the environment 
in order to help Otto undertake actions in the world; it becomes Otto’s extended mind. The 
notebook is what Richard Menary would call “a written cognitive vehicle” that has a crucial 
part in driving Otto’s cognitive processes.
12
 Otto’s example is but the first of numerous other 
examples that apply to individuals not suffering from Alzheimer’s. Using your smartphone to 
search for restaurants in an unknown city may be another example. The smartphone might be 
an extended mind for many of us, as manipulations of this vehicle help our mind to function 
efficiently and more thoroughly.
“In her genesic field it is all game and no gammon”— cognition, literature, and 
manuscripts
Enactivism and the extended mind hypothesis have been linked to literature in an 
innovative branch of narratology. Cognitive narratology “studies the mind-relevant aspects of 
storytelling”.
13
 Its area of interest is presented by Dirk Van Hulle (2014) on three levels: 
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(1) the invention and production of the storyworld; 
(2) the presentation of mental processes of the characters in the storyworld; and 
(3) the reception and interpretation of the story (the cognitive processes by means of 
which readers make sense of the narrative).
According to Van Hulle, cognitive narratologists have been extensively investigating how 
mental processes of characters are able to influence the minds of readers (levels 2 and 3), but 
have until recently not looked into the relation between the mind of the author and the minds 
of his characters (levels 1 and 2). One of the pioneering scholars in this field who is interested 
in the latter is David Herman, who has introduced a possible reassessment of modernism by 
applying the enactive approach to Joycean narrative. He sees the modernists as “explorers of 
the lived, phenomenal world that emerge from, or are enacted through, the interplay between 
intelligent agents and their cultural as well as material circumstances”.
14
 His work has been of 
great interest to Dirk Van Hulle, who aims to tackle the same issues in his recent work Modern 
Manuscripts (2014) by combining cognitive narratology with the study of writing processes, 
or genetic criticism. This combination seems useful if we want to investigate how a writer 
produces a storyworld, as it immediately shifts the focus to the writing process itself. Within 
the field of genetic criticism, Dirk Van Hulle distinguishes “endogenesis,” “exogenesis,” and 
“epigenesis.” “Epigenesis,” the après-texte, encompasses those creative processes that happen 
after the publication of a text. This is reflected in, for instance, different editions. Both “endo-” 
and “exogenesis” are linked to the term avant-texte. “Endogenesis” denotes “traces of mental 
processes [that] tend to be arranged and rearranged in multiple drafts”; “exogenesis” refers to 
external source texts that relate to the creative process.
15
 The latter two terms are especially 
useful to my project. Joyce used notebooks to enrich his manuscripts (endogenesis) with 
information gathered from books, newspapers, or other kinds of external sources (exogenesis). 
Van Hulle’s combined approach in Modern Manuscripts is therefore a logical path to pursue. 
Like genetic critics, some cognitive scientists have also taken the writing process as a 
subject. Richard Menary has an interesting take on writing, for which he approaches Clark & 
Chalmers’ theory from an enactivist perspective.
16
 Menary argues that the writing process is 
not very different from thinking. Writing, he claims, is “thought in action”.
17
 Written vehicles 
are used to manipulate the environment, which, like in Otto’s case, enables further possibilities 
of action. The project will illustrate that James Joyce’s interaction with his written vehicles 
works in the same way. Joyce’s manuscripts, notebooks, and external sources used to compose 
Finnegans Wake are part and parcel of his extended mind at work. Not only did Joyce constantly 
use notebooks to secure information from external sources, the creation of manuscripts that 
later formed the basis of the book reveals that Joyce was literally thinking on paper. Adopting 
Menary’s (2007), Herman’s (2011), and Van Hulle’s (2014) work as a preliminary basis, two main 
research questions can be stated that encompass the objectives of my project: 
(1) How can genetic criticism help to demonstrate Joyce’s extended mind at work? And 
(2) how can an application of Joyce’s extended mind at work be useful to investigate the 
evocations of his characters’ minds?
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These questions reflect the first two levels of cognitive narratology suggested in Modern 
Manuscripts. If we are able to demonstrate Joyce’s extended mind at work, we may gain a unique 
insight in Joyce’s thinking process while creating fictional worlds and, as a consequence, in 
the way Joyce gives shape to his characters’ minds. I therefore propose to create a digital 
framework that visualises Joyce’s writing process. Specifically, we will build a web environment 
for Joyce’s virtual and actual library, and establish links between the library, the notebooks, the 
manuscripts, and the finished product. The immediate area of interest is Finnegans Wake, but 
the framework needs to be developed in such a way that it can be a basis for further research. 
To achieve this objective, it is fortunately possible to rely on valuable work that has been 
done so far. For years, scholars have been “source-hunting” on the basis of intertextual 
references in the Finnegans Wake notebooks.
18
 These works list a vast amount of books that 
Joyce most likely read while composing his final novel. The list will form the basis for Joyce’s 
digital library. This becomes useful if we want to investigate Joyce’s interaction with external 
sources: books that Joyce gathered information from in order to enrich his manuscripts. The 
manuscripts of the Wake have on their part been brought together in 63 volumes called the 
James Joyce Archive and since then have been studied thoroughly.
19
 For instance, scholars have 
established and analysed the composition history, transcribed the first drafts, or approached 
every chapter from a genetic point of view.
20
 In terms of technical issues, currently operational 
web archives can be helpful for further study. Recently, Dirk Van Hulle, Mark Nixon, and 
Vincent Neyt have set up the Beckett Digital Manuscript Project. It provides access to Beckett’s 
manuscripts and offer tools to aid a genetic analysis of Beckett’s works, such as a chronology, 
different transcription possibilities, and text collation. The newest aspect is Beckett’s personal 
library, in part assembled from Van Hulle & Nixon’s Samuel Beckett’s Library (2013). For these 
reasons, the BDMP can possibly be the perfect model for a web environment on Joyce’s library.
 
Both sides of the cognitive spectrum: a possible pitfall
Despite the fact that the extended mind hypothesis is widely known, it is still a very 
controversial idea. A study that is solely based on the extended mind hypothesis would be 
extremely vulnerable to criticism that has been addressed at Clark & Chalmers’ theory. 
I therefore think it necessary to closely examine an important dispute among cognitive 
philosophers: representation. From the point of view of the extended mind, both sides of the 
representational spectrum have to be investigated. After all, the extended mind hypothesis 
does not exclude the possibility of representation. This open-minded perspective is needed, 
especially because the extended mind hypothesis has been elaborately criticised for going too 
far on this issue, or not far enough.
21
 I here briefly discuss three different interpretations. 
Patrick Colm Hogan has suggested an interesting representational concept that authors 
use to create stories: simulation. Simulation is a very familiar idea to us all. For instance, 
you may simulate your boss’s reaction if you were to ask him for a raise. It is the exercise 
of imagining what certain events and situations would be like under specific circumstances.
22 
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Another seemingly representational theory is that of the “multiple drafts model” formulated by 
Daniel Dennett in 1991. Our observations are not represented by an entity inside our skull, but 
guide the creation of different versions of the same representation, which are metaphorically 
depicted as multiple drafts.
23
 These two representational interpretations are in my view able to 
complement the enactive approach to literature in the sense that representation may never be 
completely neglected in the creation of stories. 
Considering the other side of the spectrum, the implications for the creation of Finnegans 
Wake are interesting to investigate. Radical enactivists like Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin take 
on the enactive approach as the basis for their argument. Like the enactivists, they believe that 
what humans do and experience can best be understood by studying their interaction with the 
environment. In this interaction they distinguish basic minds, illustrated by familiar examples 
like catching a swirling leaf, or watching the sun rise at the horizon. Their argument is that 
basic minds do not involve contentful representation. Modern robots are designed accordingly. 
They do not work out plans before acting; they neatly make use of their environment in order to 
function. “We act before we think” is therefore the radical enactivist credo.
24
 If they are correct, 
then the mind is not only “extended,” but also “extensive.” However, Hutto & Myin (2013) do 
not intend to argue that the mind “never” involves content. Cognitive processes are able to rely 
on pre-given information only if minds are properly scaffolded. A mind becomes scaffolded 
when it has relied on external resources to build or transform its cognitive capacities. In other 
words, the mind uses its environment to be construed and enhanced. As it goes further than 
simply using external components in cognitive processes, the scaffolded mind hypothesis 
encompasses the extended mind hypothesis.
25
 External components of the extended mind do 
not reside within human bodies. Scaffolded minds, on the other hand, have also internalised 
past interactions with its environment. The scaffold then becomes available for further use. 
The use of language is an example of a cognitive process that needs proper scaffolding. 
This has interesting consequences for the creation of Finnegans Wake. The Wakean language 
is based on compiling different words in a so-called portmanteau, for instance the word 
“meandertale” (FW 18.22).
26
 The creation of every portmanteau relies on careful consideration 
of different meanings. If we want to get to an understanding of a portmanteau, those meanings 
can be broken down, for instance in annotations. In Annotations to Finnegans Wake, Roland 
McHugh writes that “meandertale” relates to “Neanderthal Man”.
27
 However, the meaning of 
the portmanteau does not stop there. The references to a river (“meander”) and a story (“tale”) 
are equally important. To approximate the meaning of the portmanteau, we are thus forced 
to merge these separate meanings again. In other words, Finnegans Wake triggers the mind 
to build up, break down, and enhance meaning. Especially how Joyce has been working to 
conceive of these “waywords and meansigns” can contribute to our understanding of the mind, 
stories, and literary modernism. The creation of the Wake then becomes the perfect case study 
to visualise the working of Joyce’s mind according to the models proposed by cognitive science, 
and so contrive an important argument in favour of an enactivist approach to modernism, 
away from the “commonplace” interpretation of the “inward turn.”
23 Dennett, C. 
Consciousness explained. 
London: Penguin, 1991.
24 Hutto, D. and Myin, 
E. Op. cit., 2013, p. 12.
25 Sterelny, Kim. Minds: 
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Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences 
9(4),  2010, p. 473.
26 References are to 
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Wake ( Joyce 2012).
27 McHugh, R. 
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Wake. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University 
Press, 2006, p. 18.
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